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INTRODUCTION 
You have been arrested. You are put in handcuffs and transported to a 
local jail where you are fingerprinted and photographed. The crime you are 
charged with is not serious or violent, but you have prior criminal 
convictions, or perhaps a history of not coming to court when told—making 
you ineligible for a future release on your own recognizance. Bail was set, 
but like most others in the cell you occupy, you cannot pay even the smallest 
bond. You are facing a period of pretrial detention. 
A week passes without being brought to see a judge for your 
arraignment. Then another week passes. If you are lucky, you may have 
spoken to an attorney on the phone, but no one has come to the jail to see 
you. All around, individuals are beginning to talk about a mysterious new 
illness. 
As you continue to sit in pretrial detention, the spread of the novel 
coronavirus among prisoners rises quickly. By the week of April 22, 2020 
the number of confirmed cases in prisons grows three-fold—from 1,643 to 
 
 * All views expressed herein are solely those of the author. Special thanks to Madison 
Bills, Brittany Grigery, Elena Gutierrez, Matthew Roberts, and Wilfred Rumble for reading 
early drafts and providing invaluable feedback. 
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6,664.1 By the middle of September, 2020 the count is up to 132,677, with 
1,108 reported deaths.2 Mass testing reveals that the number of prisoners who 
have contracted the virus is far greater than expected, partly because of the 
number of people who carry the virus without exhibiting symptoms.3 Many 
facilities cannot conduct mass testing of inmates, and others choose not to 
test at all.4 
For you and the inmates around you not yet infected, precautionary 
measures are largely nonexistent. You are locked in a facility where social 
distancing—the primary method for avoiding transmission—is practically 
impossible.5 It is unlikely that you have ready access to hand sanitizer or face 
masks.6 Prisons and jails begin using solitary confinement as a method of 
quarantining.7 
Slowly, the wheels of justice continue to grind. You are contacted by an 
attorney who has negotiated a plea bargain in your case. If you admit guilt, 
you will be released and given what is commonly known as credit for time 
served. Your attorney explains that a jury trial may be far away, with many 
courts extending speedy trial deadlines and suspending jury trials.8 You can 
 
 1 Katie Park, Tom Meagher, & Weihua Li, Tracking the Spread of Coronavirus in Prisons, 
THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Mar. 24, 2020, 3:05 PM), https://www.themarshallproject
.org/2020/04/24/tracking-the-spread-of-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/JX7T-
UWYC]. 
 2 Katie Park, Tom Meagher, A State-by-State Look at Coronavirus in Prisons, THE 
MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 23, 2020, 6:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2
020/05/01/a-state-by-state-look-at-coronavirus-in-prisons [https://perma.cc/U98R-8VHX]. 
 3 See Jeremy Roebuck & Allison Steele, Montgomery County’s Jail Tested Every Inmate 
for COVID-19 — and Found 30 Times More Cases Than Previously Known, PHILA. INQUIRER 
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://www.inquirer.com/news/coronavirus-testing-montgomery-county-
jail-asymptomatic-philadelphia-prisons-20200428.html [https://perma.cc/5JLV-YZ4V]. 
 4 See, e.g., Jeremy Roebuck, One Philadelphia Prison Has Yet to Report a Single Case of 




 5 Jake Harper, Crowded Prisons Are Festering ‘Petri Dishes’ For Coronavirus, Observers 
Warn, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 1, 2020, 11:01 AM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-
shots/2020/05/01/848702784/crowded-prisons-are-festering-petri-dishes-for-coronavirus-
observers-warn [https://perma.cc/J4ZV-BYVU]. 
 6 Id. 
 7 UNLOCK THE BOX, THE RABEN GROUP, SOLITARY CONFINEMENT IS NEVER THE ANSWER 
(2020), https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5a9446a89d5abbfa67013da7/t/5ee7c4f1860e0
d57d0ce8195/1592247570889/June2020Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/B8G8-MBN2]. 
 8 See, e.g., Madison Alder, U.S. Court in Seattle May Not Hold Jury Trials Until 2021, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (May 28, 2020, 1:51 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/u-
s-court-in-seattle-plans-no-criminal-jury-trials-until-2021 [https://perma.cc/4VNV-6KAK]; 
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take the plea and be released from jail, or you can maintain your innocence. 
If you choose the latter, you will remain in custody with your health at a 
constantly growing risk, waiting for a jury trial that could be several months 
away—at best.9 
Imagine you are innocent of the crime for which you have been arrested 
and charged. How much would your innocence weigh on your decision to 
accept or reject a plea offer that will effectuate your release? Research into 
the cognitive science of decision-making suggests that innocent defendants 
under these circumstances are at a high risk of entering into guilty pleas.10 
Compounding this problem is the sheer volume of misdemeanor and low-
level felony cases, where the plea offer will result in immediate or almost 
immediate release from pretrial detention. These conditions pose serious 
problems for trial courts that will almost certainly end up taking “knowing 
and voluntary” pleas from numerous innocent defendants during the COVID-
19 pandemic. 
This essay briefly explores these issues and argues that the current 
COVID-19 outbreak has the potential to greatly exacerbate the coercive 
nature of pretrial detention and plea bargaining. This essay explores what it 
means constitutionally to enter what’s known as a knowing and voluntary 
plea and argues that the current state of the law does not adequately recognize 
the coercive nature of confinement conditions. 
 
Rosalio Ahumada, California Chief Justice Suspends All Jury Trials Statewide in Response 
To Coronavirus, SACRAMENTO BEE (Mar. 23, 2020, 9:08 PM), https://www.sacb
ee.com/news/coronavirus/article241453161.html [https://perma.cc/LRA7-49SC]; Adam 
Pinsker, Coronavirus Causing Courts to Suspend Jury Trials, IND. PUB. MEDIA (Apr. 3, 2020), 
https://indianapublicmedia.org/news/coronavirus-cause-courts-to-suspend-jury-trials.php 
[https://perma.cc/K24L-4DRM]; Chief Justice Issues Emergency Order Expanding Remote 
Hearings and Suspending Jury Trials into Early July Statewide, SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF FLORIDA (May 4, 2020, 3:42 PM), https://www.floridasupremecourt.org/News-
Media/Court-News/Chief-Justice-issues-emergency-order-expanding-remote-hearings-and-
suspending-jury-trials-into-early-July-statewide [https://perma.cc/5Y4T-8FC6]. 
 9 One additional consideration is that, even if jury trials were to resume, the trial process 
may still be affected by the negative psychological impacts associated with the COVID-19 
pandemic. A recent survey by NJP Litigation Consulting/West found that among the over 400 
jury eligible participants surveyed over half would find it difficult to give a trial their full 
attention, with 58% of respondents stating that they would not be willing to participate in 
deliberations that lasted more than a day. NJP LITIGATION CONSULTING/WEST, COVID-19 AND 
JURY SERVICE (2020) [https://perma.cc/WZ2W-E6BX]. 
 10 See infra Part II. 
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I. PRETRIAL CUSTODY, PLEA BARGAINING, AND THE COGNITIVE 
SCIENCE OF DECISION-MAKING 
Developed in the 1970s, the traditional view of plea bargaining—
commonly termed “bargaining in the shadow of a trial”—described criminal 
defendants as strategic decisionmakers.11 Faced with accepting or rejecting a 
plea, defendants will weigh the severity of the trial outcome and the 
probability of conviction against the severity of a proposed plea agreement.12 
Defendants, as rational actors, will strategically maximize utility—accepting 
plea agreements when the plea outcome is less than the anticipated trial 
outcome or the outcome from an open plea to the court.13 
Early experiments testing the “shadow of a trial” model found that 
“innocent” subjects could be induced to plead guilty if the right conditions 
were present—particularly when the likelihood of conviction was high.14 
Innocent subjects were just as likely to reject a plea bargain when the 
likelihood of conviction was low as they were when the chance of succeeding 
 
 11 The term originates from a paper that theorized parties to divorce proceedings would 
use anticipated court outcomes to orient themselves in private negotiations. Robert H. 
Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 
88 YALE L.J. 950, 966 (1979). In this way, divorcing parents who negotiate private dissolution 
agreements bargain “in the shadow of the law”—the basis for their bargaining position is 
driven by what each parent could expect would result from trial using the legal rules governing 
alimony, child support, marital property, and custody. Id. at 968. While the term itself did not 
appear until 1979, scholars for some time had theorized about the larger impact that criminal 
trial outcomes have on plea bargaining. See Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the 
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2465 n.2 (2004). 
 12 See Stuart S. Nagel & Marian Neef, Plea Bargaining, Decision Theory, and Equilibrium 
Models: Part I, 51 IND. L. J. 987, 999 (1976). The equation is more accurately described as 
DIS=A(LS)B, where DIS is dissatisfaction units, LS is the likely sentence expressed in years 
or other time units, A is the dissatisfaction received if LS is only one time unit, and B equals 
a positive exponent less than one to show the degree of increasing dissatisfaction from 
additional time units. 
 13 See id. at 1003. 
 14 See Kenneth S. Bordens, The Effects of Likelihood of Conviction, Threatened 
Punishment, and Assumed Role on Mock Plea Bargaining Decisions, 5 BASIC & APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 59 (1984). In the Bordens study, 422 college students were “charged” with a crime, 
assigned “innocent” or “guilty” roles, and provided with descriptions of the evidence against 
them, the likelihood of conviction, the potential sentence if a plea bargain was accepted, and 
the potential sentence if the plea bargain was rejected and the defendant convicted in court. 
Id. at 63–64. 
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at trial was 50%.15 When the likelihood of conviction was around 90%, 
however, innocent defendants became more willing to accept a plea.16 
More recent cognitive research suggests that plea decision-making is far 
more contextual than theorized and is subject to decision biases that increase 
the likelihood of innocent defendants pleading guilty.17 One important 
decision bias is “framing”—the tendency to view a decision as a gain or loss 
based on the individual’s “baseline,” or starting point.18 A noncustodial plea 
offer is more likely framed as a gain for an in-custody rather than out-of-
custody defendant because it effectuates a meaningful change in the 
defendant’s starting point.19 
The baseline of the defendant, and thus the “frame” through 
which they view the plea offer as a loss or gain can affect the ability 
of the defendant to meaningfully weigh their own innocence in the 
decision-making process. This is because individuals are more 
susceptible to decision biases when meaning based differences 
compete with each other—like choosing whether to admit guilt when 
innocent to secure a release from pretrial detention.20 In these contexts, 
the motivation to maintain one’s innocence can be dwarfed by the 
more immediate desire to be released from custody.21  
The conclusions of cognitive scientists are supported by pretrial 
detention outcomes in the real world. Individuals who are detained pretrial 
are more likely to plead guilty than those who were released pending trial.22 
These findings are magnified in the context of juveniles, who are even less 
likely to meaningfully weigh internal determinations of guilt or innocence 
when deciding to plead.23 Juveniles are not only more likely to admit guilt 
than their adult counterparts, but they are also more likely to discount long 
term consequences over short term benefits such as release from 
 
 15 Id. at 67. 
 16 Id. at 68 tbl. 1 (reporting that when the likelihood of conviction was 90%, 31.58% of 
the “innocent” subjects accepted the plea bargain—slightly more than double the percentage 
of “innocent” subjects who accepted the plea bargain when the likelihood of conviction was 
50%). 
 17 See Rebecca K. Helm, Cognitive Theory and Plea-Bargaining, 5 POL’Y INSIGHTS FROM 
THE BEHAV. & BRAIN SCI. 195, 198 (2018). 
 18 Bibas, supra note 11, at 2513. 
 19 Id. at 2514. 
 20 See Helm, supra note 17, at 198. 
 21 See id. 
 22 See Emily Leslie & Nolan G. Pope, The Unintended Impact of Pretrial Detention on 
Case Outcomes: Evidence from New York City Arraignments, 60 J.L. & ECON. 529, 543–51 
(2017). 
 23 See Helm, supra note 17, at 197–200. 
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commitment.24 This research suggests that pretrial detention plays a 
significant role in driving innocent defendants to plead guilty.25 
Compounding the coercive impact of pretrial detention is the context in 
which it occurs. Misdemeanor case filings and convictions in the United 
States grossly outweigh their felony counterparts.26 Individuals charged with 
misdemeanors also make up a significant portion of defendants subject to 
pretrial detention—in New York, about 35% of individuals charged with a 
misdemeanor spend more than a week in detention.27 Cognitive science 
suggests these individuals are the most likely to discount their own innocence 
when entering into a plea agreement because a guilty plea can effectively 
grant release from custody.28 
Now place a virus outbreak against the cognitive backdrop that innocent 
individuals will plead guilty to secure their release from confinement. It 
logically follows that a defendant’s subjective “baseline” would take into 
account the conditions of such confinement, including perceptions that 
remaining in pretrial confinement poses a serious health risk. Faced with 
indefinite pretrial detention, where the risks of exposure to a deadly virus are 
high, modern cognitive science suggests a higher likelihood of a plea by an 
innocent defendant. In a world where it is uncontested that innocent 
defendants plead guilty,29 this issue poses a legitimacy problem for the 
criminal justice system. 
 
 24 Allison D. Redlich, Stephanos Bibas, Vanessa A. Edkins, & Stephanie Madon, The 
Psychology of Defendant Plea Decision Making, 72 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 339, 346 (2017). 
 25 See Helm, supra note 17, at 199 (“[O]ffering categorical, meaning-based incentives to 
plead guilty is likely to compete with and potentially override considerations of guilt and 
innocence. The more such incentives are offered, the more likely plea offers are to be coercive 
even to innocent defendants.”). 
 26 See Alexandra Natapoff, Misdemeanors, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1313, 1314–15 (2012). 
 27 E.g., Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson, & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream 
Consequences of Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 732 (2017). 
 28 Jenia I. Turner, Plea Bargaining, in 3 REFORMING CRIM. JUST.: PRETRIAL & TRIAL 
PROCESS 73, 82 nn.48–49 (Erik Luna ed., 2017) (noting empirical studies that demonstrate 
innocent defendants are at high risk of pleading when doing so significantly reduces 
confinement length or results in immediate release); see also Natapoff, supra note 26, at 1346–
47 (noting the immense pressure to plead guilty that exists when a defendant cannot make 
bail, and when pleading guilty will result in release). This is further supported by some of the 
earliest research into plea bargain decision making that focused on the “shadow of a trial” 
theory. Bordens, supra note 14, at 70–72 (finding that, contrary to prior studies, innocence 
was discounted when in addition to a high likelihood of conviction there was a large 
differential between the plea outcome and the court sentencing outcome—i.e., when a plea 
would result in probation but a court sentence would result in continued incarceration). 
 29 Currently, around 20% of exonerations listed on the National Registry of Exonerations 
involved guilty pleas. THE NATIONAL REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, http://www.la
 
2020] INJUSTICE AND PLEA BARGAINING DURING COVID-19 97 
II. PRETRIAL CONFINEMENT CONDITIONS, PLEA VALIDITY, AND THE 
LAW 
Today it could be assumed that plea bargaining has always been 
considered a constitutionally permissible practice,30 but the constitutionality 
of plea bargaining was more open to question just over half a century ago.31 
In the 1957 case Shelton v. United States, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
addressed facts that exemplify the modern understanding of plea bargain 
decision-making when Jay Shelton was charged with interstate transportation 
of a stolen vehicle. 32 Mr. Shelton represented himself, professed his 
innocence, and fought the case, which resulted in a mistrial.33 Faced with the 
potential of a second trial, Mr. Shelton remained confident that his innocence 
would be affirmed.34 
What shook Mr. Shelton was the thought of remaining in pretrial 
detention during the second trial, and then facing additional pretrial detention 
as he fought a case in Miami.35 The prosecutor knew of this vulnerability, 
telling Mr. Shelton during a plea discussion that “ . . . a jury will convict you, 
and if they don’t convict you, you still will have to go down to Florida and 
be tried there.”36 
The prosecutor then made an offer that cognitive science tells us would 




Y] (last visited June 21, 2020). 
 30 See, e.g., STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PLEAS OF GUILTY § 14-3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 
1997). The practice has been sanctioned by the American Bar Association since 1968 as part 
of the Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
STANDARDS RELATING TO PLEAS OF GUILTY (1967) (adopted, as amended, by House of 
Delegates in 1968). The standards, however, developed in part out of the need to address 
constitutional concerns related to plea bargaining that had, up until that point, largely been 
ignored. See Howard C. Bratton, Standards for the Administration of Criminal Justice, 10 
NAT. RESOURCES J. 127, 130–32 (1970). 
 31 See, e.g., Shelton v. United States, 242 F.2d 101 (5th Cir. 1957). 
 32 Id. at 102. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See id. at 103–04. 
 35 See id. 
 36 Id. at 103. 
 37 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 2514 (“A defendant who is in pretrial detention is more 
likely to view prison as the baseline and eventual freedom as a gain, particularly if freedom is 
possible in weeks or months. Thus, one side effect of pretrial detention is that detained 
defendants may become more pliable in plea bargaining.”); Helm, supra note 17, at 197–98 
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one year (in addition to the sentence Mr. Shelton was serving on a separate 
case), and the Miami case will go away.38 Mr. Shelton insisted he would be 
acquitted on the Miami charge, but the prosecutor reminded him that even if 
he was found not guilty he would spend months in pretrial detention fighting 
the case.39 Mr. Shelton ultimately made the decision most defendants would 
be motivated to make: “[I]f I went to trial I expected to be acquitted of this 
charge, but as a matter of expediency I [took the prosecutor] up on the 
proposition, to avoid going down to Miami, spending many, many months 
[in detention].”40 
The Fifth Circuit decried the validity of the plea.41 In reversing, the 
court characterized pleas as “confess[ions] . . . of the offense[s] charged.”42 
When the record shows that the defendant will receive some benefit in 
exchange for the plea, the plea may be subject to impeachment as having 
been made involuntarily.43 The trial court must inquire, then, to ascertain 
whether the plea is being made voluntarily “in truth and in fact.”44 The court 
rested its conclusion not on the fact that Mr. Shelton had maintained his 
innocence throughout the plea bargaining process, but on the more 
fundamental notion that “[j]ustice and liberty are not the subjects of 
bargaining and barter.”45 
In a subsequent en banc hearing, this dramatic holding was reversed.46 
In a single page opinion, the court narrowed the inquiry necessary to find a 
plea was made “voluntarily.”47  For the en banc majority, a plea is 
“voluntary” so long as it is entered absent threats, misrepresentations, or 
improper promises such as bribes.48 The dissenters rebuked such a standard, 
 
(noting that, because adults rely on information processing driven by meaning-based 
distinctions, where multiple meaning-based differences are introduced—such as (1) the 
decision to plead guilty when innocent to (2) secure release from pre-trail detention—decision 
biases like framing and baselining may ultimately drown-out the importance of maintaining 
one’s innocence). 
 38 Id. at 103–04. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id. 
 41 See id. at 113. 
 42 Id. at 112. 
 43 Id. at 113. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. 
 46 Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 573 (5th Cir. 1957). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. at 572 n.2. 
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noting with prescience the coercive nature of plea bargaining and its ability 
to “elicit an untrue plea of guilty.”49 
Mr. Shelton’s case never reached the Supreme Court,50 but the nine 
justices had subsequent opportunities to address the constitutionality of plea 
bargaining. One of the earliest cases, United States v. Jackson, stands in 
contrast to most others because it set limits on plea bargaining by striking 
down a law that imposed the death penalty only after a jury trial.51 Such a 
law “chill[ed] the assertion of constitutional rights [to trial] by penalizing 
those who choose to exercise them . . . .”52 Jackson became the basis for 
challenging capital punishment laws in states like South Carolina, North 
Carolina, and New Jersey,53 and the impact of the decision on plea bargaining 
in death penalty cases is still felt today.54 
From Jackson on, however, the Supreme Court found it difficult to 
identify a plea bargain that was unconstitutional.55 While pleas must be made 
“voluntarily and knowingly,”56 it does not matter that the individual 
continues to profess his or her innocence,57 is threatened with additional 
 
 49 Id. at 579. 
 50 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, but the Solicitor General confessed error rather 
than have the court hear the merits. Shelton v. United States, 356 U.S. 26 (1958). Scholars 
have noted the potential for Shelton to have radically changed the legal landscape related to 
plea bargaining had the case been heard, given the then liberal make-up of the bench and the 
potential for a ruling that plea bargaining was a coercive practice. Daniel Epps & William 
Ortman, The Defender General, 168 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 19–20) 
(on file with author). This was perhaps a motivating factor in the Solicitor General’s decision 
to confess error rather than have the case heard—to prevent the court from being able to take 
up the issue. Id. By the time the court began to hear what are now considered to be the 
fundamental cases related to the validity of plea bargains, a serious ideological shift had 
occurred which changed the probability of success for criminal defendants arguing before the 
Supreme Court and diminished the viability of challenging the practice of plea bargaining. Id. 
at 20. 
 51 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 572 (1968). 
 52 Id. at 581. The Jackson holding was severely narrowed in subsequent cases. See, e.g., 
Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 217–21 (1978) (upholding a New Jersey statute that 
mandated a life sentence upon a jury conviction for first degree murder, but made the 
imposition of a life sentence discretionary if the defendant entered a plea of non vult). 
 53 James G. Billings, Criminal Law – United States v. Jackson and Its Impact Upon State 
Capital Punishment Legislation, 47 N.C. L. REV. 421, 426–30 (1969). 
 54 For an in-depth discussion of Jackson, plea bargaining, and the death penalty, see 
Joseph L. Hoffman, Marcy L. Kahn, & Steven W. Fisher, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of 
Death, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2001). 
 55 See Tina Wan, Note, The Unnecessary Evil of Plea Bargaining: An Unconstitutional 
Conditions Problem and a Not-So-Least Restrictive Alternative, 17 REV. OF L. & SOC. JUST. 
33, 41–45 (2007). 
 56 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 745 (1970). 
 57 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970). 
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charges,58 is charged with more serious crimes only after rejecting a plea and 
invoking the right to trial,59 or is denied access to favorable evidence.60 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the impact that 
conditions of pretrial confinement have on the voluntary nature of a plea, but 
it has delimited the boundaries of permissible pretrial confinement 
conditions.61 In the 1970s, several pretrial detainees challenged the 
conditions of their confinement at a New York correctional center, including: 
the practice of “double-bunking” in cells designed to house one prisoner; 
rules restricting detainee access to books and personal items; and 
suspicionless cavity searches.62 
The Second Circuit reasoned that individuals in pretrial custody retain 
the “rights afforded to unincarcerated individuals” from the presumption of 
innocence.63 Thus, such individuals could only be subjected to restrictions 
which “are necessary for confinement alone,” or which the government can 
justify by “compelling necessity.”64 Under the “compelling necessities” test, 
many of the conditions of the correctional center violated the due process 
rights of detainees.65 
In a 5–4 decision, with Justice Powell concurring and dissenting in part, 
the Supreme Court rejected the “compelling necessities” standard, asking 
instead whether the conditions of confinement amounted to effective 
punishment of the detainee in violation of the Due Process Clause.66 To make 
such a determination, the court looked to whether the particular condition 
 
 58 Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978). The Court in Bordenkircher left open the 
question of whether a plea becomes involuntary when third parties such as the defendant’s 
family members are threatened with criminal charges as part of the plea bargaining process. 
Id at 364 n. 8 (citations omitted) (“This case does not involve the constitutional implications 
of a prosecutor’s offer during plea bargaining of adverse or lenient treatment for some person 
other than the accused . . . which might pose a greater danger of inducing a false guilty plea 
by skewing the assessment of the risks a defendant must consider. . . .”[citation].”). However, 
several lower courts have since upheld the practice. See, e.g., Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 
836–38 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Nuckols, 606 F.2d 566, 569–570 (5th Cir. 
1979);1979). 
 59 United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982).  
 60 United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002). 
 61 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534–39 (1979). 
 62 Id. at 523–27. 
 63 Wolfish v. Levi, 573 F.2d 118, 124 (2d. Cir. 1978). 
 64 Id. 
 65 See id. at 126–32 (finding unconstitutional several conditions related to overcrowding, 
restrictions on access to reading materials, the reading by prison officials of inmate mail, 
suspicionless strip searches, and cell searches where the inmate was prohibited from observing 
the search). 
 66 Bell, 441 U.S. at 534–35. 
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was reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, for if it did 
then the condition could not, in the eyes of the court, amount to 
“punishment.”67 Such a test, compared with the compelling necessities 
standard set by the appellate court, significantly decreased the government’s 
burden to justify the confinement condition. 
The Court in Bell struggled to find any of the conditions not reasonably 
related to some legitimate governmental objective. While double-bunking 
caused “genuine privations and hardship,” the practice fell far short of 
constituting “punishment” according to the court.68 Likewise, restricting 
access to certain reading materials or personal items was found necessary to 
ensure “institutional security.”69 Even the practice of suspicionless cavity 
searches could not, in the eyes of the majority, rise to the level of an 
impermissible search constituting punishment.70 Deference towards 
correctional facility officials pervades the Court’s reasoning, and reflects a 
larger trend.71 The Justices chastised the lower appellate and district courts, 
claiming they had “trenched too cavalierly into areas that are properly the 
concern of [custodial] officials.”72 
The low burden imposed on the government in the reasonable relation 
test poses a serious hurdle to arguing that COVID-19 related confinement 
conditions rise to the level of due process violations. Some conditions 
attendant to contracting the virus like overcrowding, lack of sanitary 
conditions, and lack of testing create a hardship beyond the double-bunking 
at issue in Bell. But other conditions, like the lack of adequate personal 
protective equipment, may be ripe for a “security justification” like those 
offered to excuse restricted access to reading materials and personal items. 
Considering the extreme deference granted to custodial officials, it will be 
difficult to challenge draconian quarantine practices—like solitary 
confinement—when officials need only justify it as reasonably related to 
maintaining the health of the custodial population—an arguably legitimate 
governmental goal. 
 
 67 Id. at 538–39. 
 68 Id. at 542. 
 69 Id. at 546–47, 550–51. 
 70 Id. at 558–62. This, despite the fact that the evidence in the record before the court was 
that on only one occasion had such searches ever resulted in finding of contraband. Id. at 558. 
 71 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Persons, 55 DUKE L. J. 437, 
481–88 (2005). 
 72 Bell, 441 U.S. at 554. 
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III. COVID-19 AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 
A higher burden must be imposed on the government to justify 
potentially coercive pretrial confinement conditions in light of the ongoing—
and potentially reoccurring—public health emergency facing detention 
facilities. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Bell, derided the majority for 
diluting constitutional standards with “virtually unlimited deference to 
detention officials’ justifications for particular impositions.”73 Marshall 
instead focused on the impact that confinement conditions had on inmates 
and the powerful psychological effect that pretrial detention has on those 
separated from “family and friends.”74 
In line with this view, the Court should adopt a legal test that balances 
the deprivations of liberty against the state’s interests served, and be sensitive 
to the “tangible physical and psychological harm that a particular disability 
inflicts on detainees and to the nature of the less tangible, but significant, 
individual interests at stake.”75 Under the rule proposed by Marshall, the 
“greater the imposition on detainees, the heavier the burden of justification 
the Government would bear.”76 Adopting such a standard would allow courts 
to mitigate the coercive power of pretrial detention during public health 
pandemics. 
But even if a more liberal test like Marshall’s was adopted, it is not clear 
that proving a due process violation alone would convince a court to 
withdraw a guilty plea.77 Without clarity from a high court or legislative 
body, trial courts are unlikely to be receptive to the post-conviction claim 
that an individual involuntarily pled due to their confinement conditions. 
This lack of viable post-conviction relief increases the need for 
prophylactic measures to decrease the likelihood of innocent defendants 
pleading guilty during the COVID-19 crisis. This need persists despite past 
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confinement post-conviction. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting 
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31 (1993)) (“ . . . it is now settled that ‘the treatment a 
prisoner receives in prison and the conditions under which he is confined are subject to 
scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.’”). 
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criminal justice reform efforts to reduce prison populations, which have 
steadily advanced over the past decade.78 Early release provisions cannot 
adequately mitigate the pressure on those in pretrial detention because such 
individuals make up some two-thirds of jail inmates.79 
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, several states enacted bail reform 
measures intended to decrease pretrial detention populations.80 Many of these 
reforms succeeded in dramatically reducing the number of individuals in 
pretrial detention, including those facing minor or non-violent offenses.81 But 
bail reform efforts have been much slower to spread from state to state, with 
several seeing rollbacks or delays in implementation.82 
Thus, additional emergency orders that discourage pretrial detention for 
low-level offenses should be widely, and uniformly, used during the 
pandemic. In California, for example, the state supreme court issued an early 
directive mandating the use of an “emergency bail schedule” that set zero-
dollar bail for most misdemeanor and low-level felony charges.83 The 
emergency bail schedule was responsible for reducing nearly a third of 
detainees in California jails, and it increased the ability of inmates not 
released to comply with social distancing requirements.84 
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States that implemented emergency orders decreasing pretrial detention 
have not seen correlative increases in crime rates, contrary to law 
enforcement officials’ assertions.85 This trend is buttressed by the growing 
research that indicates long-term efforts to decrease prison populations have 
not led to significantly increased crime rates,86 and may even have a positive 
effect on lowering recidivism.87 When pretrial release programs have 
adequate infrastructure and institutional support, data also suggests that 
decreasing pretrial detention does not inevitably lead to increased rates of 
defendants failing to appear for court dates.88 
But decreasing the jail population is no substitute for judicial scrutiny. 
The dissenting judges in the en banc decision in Shelton understood this fact 
well, focusing directly on the need for courts to look beyond whether a plea 
was premised on lies or threats: “The vice is not that a misrepresentation was 
made . . . [or] that threats or force were employed . . . . The vice is that, 
because of those actions working on mind, body and will of the prisoner, he 
was led to take the step of making a guilty plea [] which he otherwise would 
not have done.”89 Until the law recognizes the coercive effects of pretrial 
detention and the plea bargaining process, the COVID-19 pandemic will only 
exacerbate an existing injustice. 
CONCLUSION 
The COVID-19 pandemic has the potential to magnify a pre-existing 
problem—innocent defendants pleading guilty to get out of jail. Modern 
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research into the cognitive science of decision-making suggests that innocent 
defendants are particularly likely to discount their own innocence when a 
guilty plea will effectuate their release from custody. The number of 
defendants presented with plea bargains that get them out of jail is large; 
credit-for-time-served offers are most highly associated with low-level 
felony and misdemeanor offenses, which make up the bulk of criminal 
filings. COVID-19 creates a significant risk of contracting a potentially fatal 
illness for those defendants who stay in custody to fight the charges they 
face—a highly motivating factor to accept a guilty plea, and one with the 
power to overshadow the value of maintaining one’s innocence. 
At the same time, there is no current legal framework to challenge a plea 
as involuntary based on the confinement conditions faced in pretrial 
detention. The conditions themselves may rise to the level of a due process 
violation, but the current legal threshold is high and largely deferential to the 
justifications of custodial officials. Furthermore, the current legal framework 
leaves unresolved whether the due process violation would invalidate the 
plea. Without a viable legal path to challenge confinement conditions and 
their coercive effect on plea decisions, prophylactic measures are needed to 
decrease the risk of innocent individuals pleading guilty. These measures 
should include the widespread use of emergency orders limiting the use of 
pretrial detention during public health crises. 
Fundamental changes to pretrial detention and the plea bargaining 
process are necessary if we want a justice system that understands and 
accounts for the way people make real-world decisions—a system of true 
justice rather than one of expediency. Such fundamental change, 
unfortunately, is unlikely to come in time for those living in an era of plea 
bargaining and COVID-19. 
